Abstract. This paper presents an application of PVS to the veri cation of security protocols. The objective is to provide mechanical support for a veri cation method described in 14]. The PVS formalization consists of a semantic embedding of CSP and of a collection of theorems and proof rules for reasoning about authentication properties. We present an application to the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol.
Introduction
Authentication protocols are used in insecure networks by principals who want to get assurance about their correspondent's identity. Designing such protocols is notoriously error-prone and attacks can often exploit weaknesses or subtle aws. Validating authentication protocols requires a rigorous analysis and several formal approaches have been advocated for this purpose 3, 16, 12, 9] .
In 14], Schneider presents such a method based on CSP 7] . The approach relies on a general network model which includes legitimate protocol participants, the users, and an intruder, the enemy. Both the users and the enemy are speci ed as CSP processes and authentication properties are expressed as constraints on the sequences of messages the whole network can produce.
The veri cation strategy uses rank functions, that is, functions which assign an integer value to messages. A key theorem shows that authentication properties can be veri ed by nding a rank function which satis es appropriate conditions. These depend on the nature of the encryption mechanism used, on the de nition of the users, and on the property to be veri ed. An important bene t of the technique is to decompose an authentication property { a global property of a network { into local properties of the protocol participants.
This paper shows how the PVS theorem prover 5] can provide e ective mechanical support to the above method. Using a semantics embedding of CSP, we specify the general network model in PVS and derive the important theorems about authentication and rank functions. We then de ne specialised PVS rewrite rules and proof commands to facilitate the veri cations. With these rules and commands, the proofs of authentication are very systematic and require only little manual guidance. This allows the user to concentrate on the most important aspects of the analysis: nding rank functions.
In the remainder of this paper, we give a brief introduction to CSP and an overview of the modelling and analysis approach. We then describe the formalization of the network model and of the veri cation method in PVS. We give a simple example of application to the Needham Schroeder public key protocol 10]. Finally, we discuss and compare our developments with other mechanisations of CSP and with other veri cation methods for security protocols.
2 Authentication Protocols in CSP 2.1 CSP Notation CSP is an abstract language for describing concurrent systems which interact through message passing 7] . Systems are modelled in terms of the events they can perform, each event corresponding to a potential communication between a system and its environment. CSP is a process algebra: systems are constructed from a set of elementary processes which can be combined using operators such as pre xing, choice, or parallel composition. Di erent semantic models are available; in this paper only the simplest { the so-called trace semantics { is considered.
We assume that a xed set of all possible events is given. A process is characterised by a set of traces, that is, nite sequences of elements of . Each trace represents a possible sequence of communications one can observe on the process interface. The set of traces of a process P is pre x-closed; if one observes a trace tr then all the pre xes of tr have been seen before.
The particular dialect we use includes four primitive notions. The syntax of process expressions is as follows: P ::= Stop j a ! P j i2I P i j P 1 P 2 j P 1 j A]j P 2 j P 1 jjj P 2 ;
where a is an element of , I a non-empty set, and A a subset of . These expressions have the following informal interpretation. { Stop is the process which cannot engage in any event (deadlock). { a ! P is able initially to perform only the event a after which it behaves as P.
{ i2I P i is the choice among an indexed family of processes P i . The resulting process can behave as any one of the P i . When only two processes are involved, choice is denoted by P 1 P 2 .
{ P 1 j A]j P 2 is the parallel composition of P 1 and P 2 with synchronization on events in A. If one of the processes is willing to engage in an event of A then it has to wait until the other is ready to perform the same event. On events which do not belong to A, P 1 and P 2 do not synchronise; they can perform any such event independently of each other. P 1 jjj P 2 is an abbreviation for P 1 j ;]j P 2 .
A Model for Authentication Protocols
In the analysis of authentication protocols, we consider the general network architecture shown in Fig. 1 . The network consists of a set of user processes and of an enemy which has full control over the communication medium. The enemy can block, re-address, duplicate, corrupt, or fake messages but we assume that it cannot decrypt or encrypt messages without the appropriate keys. . . .
Fig. 1. The network
Each user has a unique identity. Its interface with the medium consists of two channels, one for transmission and one for reception. Accordingly, communications are modelled by two types of events. A transmission event is of the form trans:i:j:m and is interpreted as \user i sends a message m destined for user j". A reception event is of the form rec:i:j:m and means \i receives a message m, apparently from user j". The communication channels are private; no user other than i can produce events of the form trans:i:j:m or rec:i:j:m.
In order to model the capabilities of the enemy, we use a relation`which speci es when new messages may be generated from existing ones: S`m means that knowledge of all the messages of the set S is enough to produce the message m. The relation depends on the particular encryption mechanism used but we can assume that certain natural conditions are satis ed, such as, This describes the behaviour of an enemy which has knowledge of a set of messages S. Such a process can either allow a user to transmit a message m after which it behaves as ENEMY(S fmg) or generate a new message from the set S and send it to an arbitrary destinator. The users do not communicate directly with each other but the enemy and the composition of users synchronize on all transmission and reception events.
Checking Authentication Properties
The speci cation of various security properties is discussed in 13]. Authentication involves two disjoint sets of events T and R; a process P satis es the property T authenticates R if occurrence of any event of T in a trace of P is preceded by occurrence of some element of R. This is denoted by P sat T authenticates R:
(1) Examples in 14] illustrate how this relates concretely to authentication. Formally, T authenticates R is an abbreviation for the trace predicate tr R = hi ) tr T = hi; (2) where denotes projection 3 and hi is the empty trace. The statement (1) is interpreted as \all the traces tr of P satisfy predicate (2)", that is, any trace of P which does not contain events of R does not contain events of T either.
In order to verify authentication properties of a protocol, we have to prove statements of the form NET sat T authenticates R. It can be seen that this condition is equivalent to NET j R]j Stop sat tr T = hi:
This equivalence is the basis of the proof strategy described in 14]. The idea is to assign to every message m an integer value (m) called its rank in such a way that messages occurring in events of T have non-positive rank while only messages of positive rank can be produced by NET j R]j Stop. Let M be the message space for a given protocol. A rank function is a function from M to the integers. Given such a function, we denote by A process is any set of traces which contains the empty trace null and which is pre x-closed. All general results about sets or sets of traces apply then immediately to processes.
The CSP primitives are easily de ned 6]. It is also convenient to generalise the two parallel composition operators to arbitrary (non-empty) families of processes. This non-standard extension of CSP does not pose any theoretical problem in the trace model and generalises the results presented in Sec. 2. We can consider networks with in nitely many users and all the theorems still hold. Moreover, the PVS statement and proof of these theorems are much simpler if in nite parallel composition is allowed.
Since PVS has a xed syntax, we cannot use the standard CSP notations. Instead we use existing PVS symbols as indicated in Tab. 1. The operators Choice and Interleave are polymorphic functions which apply to indexed families of processes. For example, Choice is of parametric type U -> process T]] -> process T]]. PVS has a special syntax for denoting the applications of such functions to lambda terms; Choice(lambda i: P(i)) can be written Choice! i: P(i). More complex expressions are also valid:
In the two expressions above, PVS infers the correct parameter instantiation from the types of the variables and processes. In the rst case, U is instantiated with a tuple type and in the second case, U is instantiated with the dependent type i:nat, fj:nat| i < jg]. The preceding elements allow us to de ne CSP processes in PVS. In order to reason about such processes, we provide various lemmas such as the associativity of choice and parallel composition 6]. For specifying properties of processes we imitiate the sat operator. Properties are predicates on traces, that is, sets of traces, and the satisfaction relation is |>(P, E): bool = subset?(P, E). The enemy is de ned using the least xed point operator. The process depends on two type parameters as above and on a message generation relation. For such a de nition to be sound, PVS requires us to show that F is monotonic by generating a proof obligation (TCC) 11].
Users can be arbitrary processes provided they satisfy the interface constraints. The type user process below captures this restriction: The function sigma gives the set of events P can generate. Any user of the above type is a function of domain Identity and range process T] such that the set of events generated by user(i) is included in LocalEvents(i). For de ning networks, we use the function network(baddy, P): process T] = Par(fullset)(baddy, Interleave(P)), where baddy is any process and P is of type Identity -> process T]]. The constant fullset is the set of all transmission and reception events.
Key Theorems
The main results of Sec. 2 are proved in a theory network which has the same parameters as enemy and makes the following assumption: Within the theory, monotonic gen can be used like an axiom, but PVS generates a TCC to check that the assumption holds when one imports a particular instance of network. A rst lemma follows from the previous assumption and is proved using the induction rule for least xed points: Informally, this means that any message enemy(S) can produce is generated from the set S and the messages the enemy has intercepted from users. Now, given a function rho of type Message->int], we de ne two trace predicates: If the two premisses are satis ed then the enemy cannot generate messages of non-positive ranks unless it receives such messages from the users.
For convenience, we use a speci c restriction operator; the process P j R]jStop is written P # R in PVS. We then get the following essential property: 
Automating the Veri cations
The previous theorem is the main tool for verifying authentication properties. When using it, most of the e ort concentrates on properties of the form user(i) # R |> RankUser(rho). There are also hidden conditions which arise from the type of user: we have to prove that user(i) can only generate events which belong to LocalEvents(i). All these proofs can be partially automated by using the PVS rewriting facilities and by de ning speci c proof strategies.
The interface constraints are of the form subset?(sigma(P), E) where P is a CSP expression and E is a set of events. We can systematically develop rules which rewrite the above inclusion in a simpler form according to the top-level operator of P. There is such a rule for every CSP primitive; a few examples are given below: All such lemmas can be installed as automatic rewrite rules which PVS applies in conjunction with built-in simpli cation and decision procedures. The rst two rules are inconditional rewritings which applies in the left to right direction; interface stop is also inconditional but matching terms are rewritten to true. The last rule is conditional: terms matching the right hand side of the implication reduce to true provided the premisses are also reduced to true by the decision procedures or by further rewriting. Lemma interface pref introduces expressions of the form E(a). For user processes, E is LocalEvents(i) for some xed i and two more rewrite rules are necessary:
local transmission: LEMMA LocalEvents(i)(trans(i, j, m)) local reception: LEMMA LocalEvents(i)(rec(i, j, m)).
In practice, automatic rewriting with these two rules and the preceding lemmas prove almost all interface constraints. The few exceptions are usually due to xed points. The presence of quanti ers in the rules for xed points interrupts the chain of rewrites and little manual intervention is required before rewriting can proceed. For properties of the form P # R |> RankUser(rho), rewrite rules can also largely reduce the proof e ort. However, rewriting is not su cient and the rules must be supplemented with speci c proof strategies.
In a similar way as above, two sets of rewrite rules are constructed which apply to expressions of the form P # R or P |> RankUser(rho). For example, the rules for pre x and Stop are: Such lemmas are more complex than the interface rules and automatic rewriting does not work as well. The rst three examples illustrate some of the di culties. PVS considers restriction pref as a conditional rule which applies only if B(a) reduces to true or false. This cannot be expected in general since B depends on the authentication property being checked. The other two lemmas introduce terms involving rank functions which cannot systematically reduce to true. As a result, the chains or reductions required to apply conditional rules often fail. Despite these limitations, some form of automation is still possible. The proofs of P # R |> RankUser(rho) have a regular pattern and the same sequences of proof commands are applied repeatedly. For example, if P is of the form rec(i,j,m) >> Q then the corresponding PVS proof starts by the following sequent:
The natural rst step is to apply (rewrite "restriction pref"). This yields
The obvious case split generates two subgoals. The rst one can be solved immediately using the rewrite rules for Stop and the second is:
Lemma rank user input can be applied and further propositional simpli cation yields:
At this point, the same sequence of proof commands applies if Q is a pre x expression which starts by a reception event. More generally, successive goals in such proofs are of the form ... |----{1} P # R |> RankUser(rho)
... and the syntactic form of P determines a sequence of commands which can be used systematically. We exploit this regularity by de ning speci c proof strategies. An initialisation strategy installs automatic rules for Stop together with rank user input and rank user output. The other strategies correspond to particular CSP operators. For example, the strategy (prefix) applies the following command:
(try (rewrite "restriction pref") (then* (lift-if) (assert) (prop)) (skip)).
This performs the four steps of the proof sketched previously. The strategy attempts to rewrite the current goal with restriction pref. If this fails, (skip) leaves the goal unchanged, otherwise, an expression of the form IF R(a) THEN Stop ELSE a >> (P # R) ENDIF is introduced. Three commands are then applied successively. In the second step, (assert) activates automatic rewriting. As a result, the rst branch of the conditional is reduced to true and the second branch is rewritten by one of rank user input or rank user output. The e ect of (prefix) depends on whether a is a transmission or a reception event and is described in Fig. 2 . ?`(a ! P) # R sat RankUser( ); Fig.2 . E ect of the prefix strategy.
With similar strategies for the other CSP primitives, the proofs can be conducted at a fairly abstract level. The details of the PVS mechanics are hidden from the user who simply selects the right strategy. When none applies, the remaining sequents do not contain any process expression and correspond to simple properties of the rank function which have to be proved by other means. The structure of the proofs is for a large part independent of the rank function under investigation. It is easy to experiment with various rank functions and most of the proofs remain unchanged.
Applications
We have experimented the PVS mechanization on two versions of the Needham Schroeder public key protocol 10]. All the properties examined in 14] have been mechanically veri ed 6]. In the sequel, we consider the following variant proposed by Lowe 9] is not sound; it contradicts the data type axioms. Instead we use a function crypto which performs message normalisation. We can then de ne the message generation relation |-as follows:
Gen(S)(m): INDUCTIVE bool = S(m) OR (EXISTS m1, m2: Gen(S)(m1) AND Gen(S)(m2) AND m=conc(m1, m2)) OR (EXISTS m1: Gen(S)(conc(m1, m)) OR Gen(S)(conc(m, m1))) OR (EXISTS m1, k: Gen(S)(m1) AND Gen(S)(k) AND m=crypto(k, m1)); |-(S, m): bool = Gen(S)(m).
Gen(S) is the set of messages which can be generated from S and is de ned inductively. PVS automatically generates two induction axioms for Gen from which we can show the required monotonicity assumption: gen monotonic2: COROLLARY subset?(S1, S2) AND (S1 |-m) IMPLIES (S2 |-m).
Users and Veri cations
The modelling allows several variants of the protocol to be analysed, from the simple case of two participants executing a single run to multiple runs executed concurrently. In a simple example, the initiator is described by the process below userA: process event] = Choice! i, x: ( trans(a, i, pub(i, conc(Na, user(a)))) >> ( rec(a, i, pub(a, conc3(Na, x, user(i)))) >> ( trans(a, i, pub(i, x)) >> Stop event]))).
User A non-deterministically initiates a single run with some user i by sending the message fN a ; ag encrypted with K i . Then A is ready to receive a message of the form fN a ; x; ig Ka coming from i where x is any nonce. A responds to this message by sending back fxg Ki .
We assume that the responder B behaves as if participating in a run with A: The interface constraints are easily checked. The proof script for interface userA is given below:
(AUTO-REWRITE "local_transmission" "local_reception" "interface_pref event]" "interface_stop event]") (EXPAND "userA") (REWRITE "interface_choice3").
The rst command installs the automatic rewrite rules presented in Sec. 4.3 and the second expands the de nition of userA. The third step is a manual application of the interface rule for unbounded choice. This triggers automatic rewriting and the goal is solved at once.
The proofs of the rank preservation properties apply the strategies for choice and pre x. On the remaining goals, we use the prede ned strategy (grind) which expands the de nitions of rho and R and applies the decision procedures. This is often enough to solve the goals but sometimes the extensionality axioms for the message data type are needed (see 6] for details). For example, the proof script of rank user a is (INIT-CSP "Identity" "message") (EXPAND "userA") (CHOICE3) (PREFIX) (("1" (DELETE 2) (GRIND)) ("2" (PREFIX) (PREFIX) (DELETE 3 4) (GRIND) (CASE "x_user(y_conc(conc(conc(....)))) = b") (("1" (APPLY (REPEAT (APPLY-EXTENSIONALITY)))) ("2" (REPLACE -2) (ASSERT)))))).
The proofs of authentication properties we have performed with PVS are all similar to the previous example. The most general situations, where concurrent protocol runs are considered, require much more complex rank functions. But, even in such cases, the PVS proofs are not substantially harder. The same proof strategies are used together with (grind) and extensionality rules.
6 Discussion and Related Work This paper shows that PVS can provide e cient support for a non-trivial application of CSP. The usefulness of the mechanisation is clear. In our experience, manual veri cation of the constraints on rank functions simply does not work. PVS has found many errors in our own manual proofs of authentication properties. The proofs we performed generalise the results presented in 9] to more complex variants of the Needham Schroeder protocol. In recent works, larger protocols have been veri ed 2].
The basis of our mechanisation is a semantics embedding of CSP and PVS is adequate for this purpose. Camilleri 4] and Thayer 17] present similar embeddings in HOL and IMPS. Our main contribution compared with these works is the application to the speci c problem of authentication and the development of PVS theories for this purpose.
In the analysis of security protocols, tools exist which support various belief logics 3, 1]. Closer to our approach are methods based on modelling protocols as collections of rules for transforming and reducing messages. Tool support in this area 9, 8] is mostly based on analysis for reachability of an insecure state which corresponds to the existence of an attack. This usually requires nitary models and the inability to nd an attack does not in itself guarantee correctness of the full-scale protocol. Our veri cation approach is then a useful complement to these state exploration techniques. Paulson 12] investigates the application of Isabelle/HOL to proving security properties of protocols by induction. He speci es protocols in terms of traces and rules about how traces can be augmented. This is clearly very close to the CSP trace model but gives no control over when rules may apply. In contrast, the CSP approach maintains the order of protocol steps and the order in which proof rules are applied. Paulson has some useful results about proof reuse while at present we know little about the potential reusability of rank functions.
In future developments we envisage to increase the level of proof automation. Currently, we provide specialised proof commands but the user still has to manually select the right rule. This could be automatized; the rule to apply can be determined from the top-level operator in a CSP process. Another extension would be to allow a more exible modelling of the space of messages. The use of a PVS data type implies that messages constructed in di erent ways are di erent. Algebraic properties (such as the associativity of concatenation or the fact that public-key and private-key encryption are inverse of each other) cannot be introduced as equations. The approach of 14] remains valid even in the presence of more complex equational properties. This can be implemented with PVS but requires extra developments, such as a quotient construction for data types.
Another important avenue to explore will be the extent to which construction of rank functions can be assisted by the attempt to provide a PVS proof. Particular constraints on the rank function arise when instantiating the CSP rules and could be generated by a \blank" run of the PVS proof: the rank constraints appear as unresolved leaves in the proof-tree. Collecting the information may then help us to identify a suitable rank function.
In conclusion, we have presented a viable mechanical support in PVS for the veri cation of security protocols with respect to authentication properties. There is still much to be done to support veri cation in the presence of algebraic properties of cryptographic mechanisms, to improve automation, and to gain experience by investigating further protocols.
